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Abstract  
Senior managers can have a strong influence on organisational safety. But little is known about 
which of their personal attributes support their impact on safety. In this paper, we introduce the 
concept of ‘safety intelligence’ as related to senior managers’ ability to develop and enact safety 
policies and explore possible characteristics related to it in two studies.  Study 1 (N = 76) involved 
direct reports to chief executive officers (CEOs) of European air traffic management (ATM) 
organisations, who completed a short questionnaire asking about characteristics and behaviours that 
are ideal for a CEO’s influence on safety.  Study 2 involved senior ATM managers (N=9) in various 
positions in interviews concerning their day-to-day work on safety.  Both studies indicated six 
attributes of senior managers as relevant for their safety intelligence, particularly, social competence 
and safety knowledge, followed by motivation, problem-solving, personality and interpersonal 
leadership skills.  These results have recently been applied in guidance for safety management 
practices in a White Paper published by EUROCONTROL.   
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Safety Intelligence: An exploration of senior managers’ characteristics  
1. Introduction 
Major accident investigations show that senior managers have a particular influence on 
organisational safety (e.g. Baker, 2007; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill, 2011).  This paper presents two studies carried out in European air traffic management 
(ATM), which has a good safety record, but nevertheless suffered a major accident (mid-air 
collision) with 71 fatalities near Überlingen in Germany in 2002.  The investigators found that the 
way senior management dealt with safety issues was related to the occurrence of the accident: 
“[…], managers can change and improve existing corporate culture by establishing safety – 
recognisable for all staff members – as high priority.  Feedback and continual reinforcement from 
the most senior management down will help develop dedication and accountability that is 
desirable.” (p. 90; BFU, 2004).   
Senior positions in organisations differ from lower levels (Hambrick, 1989).  Senior managers can 
influence up to 45% of organisations’ performance (Day & Lord, 1988) and have a distinct influence 
on organisational safety (Clarke, 1999).  Reviews of the safety climate literature (Flin, et al. 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2007) identified management’s attitudes and behaviours as a predominant safety 
climate factor.  Two more recent meta-analyses (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009) identified 
perceptions of management safety commitment as one of the most influential safety climate 
components in relation to organisational safety performance. While these reviews and meta-analyses 
suggest that senior managers are central for organisational safety, studies involving senior managers 
are scarce (Flin, 2003).  As a consequence it is unclear which personal attributes support their 
influence on safety.    
In this paper, we examine senior managers’ characteristics through the concept of ‘safety 
intelligence’.  The strategic leadership literature describes a senior manager’s understanding of 
business issues and their ability to develop policies as ‘strategic intelligence’ (e.g. Yukl, 2001).  
Accordingly, we use the term ‘safety intelligence’ as a concept that captures senior managers’ 
understanding of safety issues and knowledge relevant to their policy-making in relation to safety 
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(Kirwan, 2008).  Zohar (2008) suggests that the ways in which senior managers develop and enact 
their policies are central to their influence on safety and their policy-making has been found to 
significantly contribute to employee safety climate perceptions and safety performance (Cohen, 1977; 
DeJoy et al., 2005).  
The aim of the two studies reported in this paper is to identify the personal characteristics that 
support senior managers’ ability to intelligently manage their organisations’ safety, i.e. to make and 
enact policies that will have a positive effect on safety.  Leadership is mostly conceptualised through 
interpersonal leadership behaviours with a focus on the relationships that a manager or supervisor 
establishes with his or her subordinates (Zaccaro & Horn, 2003) and that is also the dominant 
approach in studies on leadership and safety (e.g. Clarke, 2013).  However, in this study, we focus on 
traits and skills that can support senior managers in having a positive influence on safety, based on 
the following rationale. According to Zaccaro (2001), senior managers operate at a system wide level 
and do not have much opportunity to establish such interpersonal relations with members of their 
organisation.  Therefore, interpersonal leadership theories are unlikely to cover all relevant aspects 
of senior level influence.  Our approach follows the tradition of Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper 
echelons theory and considers personal characteristics to be relevant for senior managers’ influence 
on safety. Traits (personality & motivation), skills (social competence & problem-solving) and 
knowledge have been proposed as influencing leader performance (Mumford et al., 2000) and as 
particularly relevant for strategic management (e.g. Day & Lord, 1988; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
Studies concerned with senior managers’ influence on organisational attributes have focussed on their 
personal characteristics. For example, Huffman and Hegarty (1993) found senior managers’ 
externally oriented expertise and their planning and control abilities to largely influence innovations 
in organisations. Berson et al. (2008) found CEO values, such as benevolence, security and self-
direction, to influence attributes of organisational culture, such as bureaucratic, innovative and 
supportive culture. Other studies report CEOs’ personality (particularly need for achievement) as 
impacting organisational culture, strategy and structure via the rationality in their strategy making 
(Miller & Dröge, 1986; Miller et al., 1988; Miller & Toulouse, 1986).   
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The investigation of senior managers’ influence on organisational safety presented in this paper 
represents an aspect of macroergonomics, i.e. the analysis and design of work systems, which also 
include organisations.  Hendrick (2002) describes this ergonomics discipline as overlapping with 
organisational psychology and this is also the case for this paper. Consequently, our study sits on the 
overlapping fringes of ergonomics and organisational psychology in that it addresses a group that 
crucially shapes macro-level work systems (i.e. organisations) and investigates this issue via 
psychological characteristics of senior managers. 
We investigate this issue in air traffic management (ATM), an industry that majorly contributes 
to airspace safety (EUROCONTROL, 2005).  ATM organizes traffic flow and helps to prevent the 
collision of aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization Policy; February, 
2010).  ATM’s services involve balancing safety against other pressures such as traffic throughput, 
providing short cuts in the airspace, safety benefits and economic costs of a new technological 
investment (e.g. radar system), or flight level request from pilots in order to reduce the airlines’ fuel 
costs.  Findings obtained in this highly reliable industry might be transferable to others and can 
promote cross-industry learning.  The following section introduces the five characteristics (traits, 
skills and knowledge) we suggest as relevant for senior managers’ safety intelligence.   
1.1. Traits: Personality and Motivation  
We propose the Big Five personality factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992) to support senior managers’ 
ability to develop effective strategic safety policies and to enact them. For example, a senior manager 
who is highly extraverted may communicate his or her safety policies more forcefully.  A more 
agreeable senior manager may be able to create a greater sense of trust, which can be positively related 
to safety (Clarke & Robertson, 2005) and can help them to enact the safety policies convincingly.  
According to Peterson et al. (2003), conscientious senior managers are more likely to be task focused, 
and thus may develop safety related policies more cautiously.  A senior manager who is low on 
emotional stability may be less effective in actively and safely controlling stressful situations (Clarke 
& Robertson, 2005) and this might affect his or her capability to develop effective safety policies.  
Senior managers’ openness to experience may support them in being more receptive to learning 
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(Clarke & Robertson, 2005), helping them to develop a broader range of safety knowledge and 
consequently devise better safety policies.   
In addition, a motivational trait conceptualised as regulatory focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) that 
has previously been applied to safety (Wallace & Chen, 2006), might influence senior managers’ 
safety policy making.  Motivational traits have been found to relate to senior managers’ impact on 
other organisational outcomes (e.g. structure; Miller & Dröge, 1986).  Regulatory focus describes 
individuals to be motivated towards a goal via a pronounced promotion and prevention focus. 
Promotion focus leads individuals to follow an eagerness strategy and a desire to complete tasks 
quickly.  A pronounced prevention focus leads individuals to follow a vigilant strategy and avoid 
negative outcomes (Wallace et al., 2008), thus avoiding risks when developing and communicating 
safety policies. Accordingly, a prominent prevention focus may support senior managers’ safety 
intelligence.  This can arise through two mechanisms: first, more prevention focussed managers might 
pay more attention to detail and spend more time on safety issues.  Time is usually a limited resource 
for senior managers and the amount of time they spend on safety issues has been described as 
conveying their personal value for safety (Flin, 2003).  Secondly, a more pronounced prevention 
focus might support managers to prioritise safety issues in their policies and communication with the 
workforce.  
1.2 Skills: Problem-solving and social competence 
Management’s approach towards safety related problems can function as a frame of reference for 
the workforce and can reflect senior managers’ commitment to safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  We 
suggest that creative problem-solving (Isaksen & Treffinger, 2004; i.e. investigation of problems, 
idea generation, planning ability) supports senior managers’ safety intelligence as it ultimately 
contributes to the ways in which managers devise safety policies. Because the way senior managers 
solve problems shapes organisations and work conditions (e.g. equipment, staffing level), this can 
also have an immediate effect on the perceived status of safety in organisations.   
Personable communication of senior managers with the workforce is frequently emphasised as 
relevant to conveying their safety messages (e.g. Harper et al., 1996, Hopkins, 2011).  A recent study 
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involving senior managers has investigated their language as a leadership tool through which they 
might influence organisational safety culture (Fruhen et al., 2013a).  Accordingly, social competence 
(Baron & Markman, 2000; i.e. their ability to interact with others effectively through for example 
perception of others intentions, persuasion) can contribute to senior managers’ ability to communicate 
about safety with subordinates and support the ways in which they enact safety policies.   
1.3 Knowledge 
Finally, safety knowledge may also contribute to senior managers’ safety intelligence. Knowledge 
has been described as one of the main tenets of senior managerial power (Finkelstein, 1992) and has 
been reported to relate to safety performance at other levels of the organisation (e.g. Griffin & Neal, 
2000).  Safety knowledge can enable senior managers to understand safety related information and 
to draw meaningful conclusions from it and in doing so, affect their ability to develop effective safety 
policies.  
 
In this paper, we empirically identify the role of these characteristics for senior managers’ safety 
intelligence in two studies.  The first study focuses on CEOs, the most senior managers in 
organisations.  Using a questionnaire, it investigates whether their direct reports view certain 
characteristics as desirable for CEOs’ influence on safety.  The second study is an interview study 
involving a small sample of CEO’s and other senior managers and investigates the role of the 
characteristics in their actual work on safety.  The results should enable insights into the relevance of 
these characteristics that can be important for the selection, education and training of senior managers.  
2. Study 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Sample 
The sample consisted of 76 senior managers (safety directors and managers), who all worked in 
European air traffic management (ATM) in positions that required them to interact frequently with 
the CEO of their organisation (the majority reported to meet the CEO on a daily basis).  On average, 
participants had been in their position for 6 years (range 6 months - 20 years) and the majority had 
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backgrounds in ATM or engineering.  We did not ask for more demographic information in order to 
maintain participants’ anonymity, as they were asked to provide information regarding their 
superiors.  
ATM is provided by organisations (public and private) called Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSPs) whose employees guide airplanes at airports and en-route to avoid traffic conflicts and 
ensure safety and efficiency.  Safety Directors and Managers working for an ANSP play a key role 
in managing air traffic safety, as they are the most senior safety persons in these organisations.  They 
are responsible for the Safety Management System (SMS) of the organisation, must liaise with safety 
regulatory authorities, are required to work with other Directors/Managers (e.g. Operations, Human 
Resources, Engineering, or Finance) to keep the Executive Board aware of key safety risks and trends 
and are responsible for safety training and safety surveys.  In the event of an accident, the Safety 
Manager/Director will be at the front line, working with legal counsel to liaise with the external 
investigation body.  We did not have access to a sample of CEOs but evaluated this sample of safety 
directors as familiar with the requirements of CEOs’ work on safety for two reasons: First, they 
frequently interact with CEOs in their work, and are familiar with the requirements and frequent 
activities entailed in a CEO’s role.  Second, they can be considered to be the most senior safety experts 
in ANSPs, with sound safety knowledge and extensive responsibility for safety. Because the safety 
managers were asked to describe CEOs, the risk of self-presentation effects were reduced (Morgeson 
et al., 2004), such as impression management and social desirability effects.   
2.1.2 Procedure 
Participants were recruited during three meetings organised by the European Agency for the Safety 
of Air Traffic Management (EUROCONTROL; response rate 68%).  Participants completed a 
questionnaire, consisting of two open questions on characteristics and behaviours that were devised 
with the help of a subject matter expert in ATM.  Because not much is known about attributes of 
CEOs in relation to safety, open questions were used.  The questionnaire asked participants “What 
kind of person do you think an ideal CEO should be regarding his or her effect on safety?  Start with 
the most important characteristic” and “What behaviour do you think an ideal CEO should 
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demonstrate regarding his or her effect on safety? Start with the most important behaviour”.  By 
asking for ideal, rather than actual personal attributes, we were more likely to identify good, rather 
than common practice.  The questionnaires had allocated space for 5 responses to each question and 
participants on average provided four descriptions for each question. Using this format in the 
questionnaire allowed us to maintain an exploratory approach while including a larger number of 
people under standardised conditions, so that the results are likely to be robust and applicable to many 
organisations.  
2.1.3 Analysis 
The coding of the responses followed the procedures of content analysis (Mayring, 2000). 
Responses were allocated into the five attributes derived from the literature whenever possible with 
non-allocated responses coded to reflect additional concepts.  Two independent raters were provided 
with definitions and coding rules (Dey, 1993, see Appendix).  After independently coding 50% of the 
questionnaires, the two raters discussed possible changes to the coding scheme.  The majority of 
responses could be coded into the predefined attributes.  Responses that did not fit into these 
categories mostly reflected interpersonal leadership so that an additional category of ‘leadership’ was 
introduced.  This category included transformational and transactional leadership behaviours (Bass, 
1985), as well as authentic leadership (Avolio et al., 2004).  Both raters coded the remaining 
questionnaires and reviewed the previously coded questionnaires using the revised coding scheme.  
Interrater reliability of the coding was tested with Krippendorff’s alpha (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) 
and achieved an agreement of α = .76 (95% CILL .73 to CIUL.80).   
2.2. Results and Summary of Study 1 
Overall, 86% of the responses were identified as the five attributes listed above, which suggests 
that these concepts captured the data well (see Table 1).  Additionally, leadership was identified in 
14% of the responses, mostly reflecting transformational (“visionary”) and transactional leadership, 
as well as authenticity.  Out of the personal characteristics, social competence (16% of the responses) 
and safety knowledge (15% of the responses) were found to be particularly relevant for a CEO’s 
influence on organisational safety.  The majority of the responses identified as social competence 
SAFETY INTELLIGENCE 10 
 
referred to a CEO’s ability to listen (“being a good listener”, “asks questions”).  The literature 
describes the ability of senior managers to convey strong safety messages as central (e.g. Harper et 
al., 1996).  The descriptions identified in this study however suggest that having an ‘open ear’ for 
safety problems is equally, if not more important for a CEO.  Responses identified as safety 
knowledge frequently related to theoretical and practical understanding of safety (“understanding of 
safety issues”), as well as facts and information (“knows about safety”) and background and 
education (“educated in safety problems”).  These responses suggest the ideal CEO requires to be 
educated in safety and to understand safety issues and risks.  Although problem-solving was less 
frequently mentioned (11% of the responses), responses identified as reflecting this concept mostly 
referred to a CEO’s ability to understand problems by considering multiple sources of information 
(“makes informed decisions”), suggesting an inquiring mode as a relevant quality in CEOs’ 
approaches to safety problems.    
The content of the responses identified as personality (14% of the responses) often reflected 
aspects of conscientiousness (“reliable”), agreeableness (“approachable”) and openness to 
experience (“open to new ideas”).  The personality trait of agreeableness may support a CEO’s 
engagement with others and encourage staff to speak up about safety by generating trust (Clarke & 
Roberts, 2005).  The rigor in a CEO’s engagement with safety related issues is likely to be driven by 
his or her conscientiousness.  Furthermore, openness to new ideas can help CEOs not to dismiss new 
thinking around safety problems. Finally, responses identified as regulatory focus (11% of the 
responses) mostly reflected prevention focus (“proactive in the safety domain”) as facilitating CEOs’ 
work on safety issues through an avoidance of negative outcomes (Wallace & Chen, 2006).   
2.4 Strengths and limitations Study 1 
One of this study’s strength is the sample of senior managers, who are direct reports of CEOs.  
Although we did not have access to CEOs directly, we captured the views of individuals who are 
familiar with the work of CEOs, are the most senior safety specialists in organisations and are at the 
receiving end of CEOs’ safety messages.   
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The use of questionnaires enabled data collection under standardised conditions.  Nevertheless, 
the open question format might have biased the results. Participants were not asked to provide actual, 
safety related behaviours and characteristics of CEOs.  By asking for the ideal behaviours and 
characteristics of CEOs, we gained insights which can ultimately be used for the development of 
guidance and best practice sharing.  However, it is also possible that these questions triggered 
respondents’ implicit beliefs about ideal safety leadership.  Furthermore, the response format used in 
this study might have de-contextualised the findings and the generated responses are not very rich in 
their content.  
3. Study 2 
To further explore the role of the characteristics for senior managerial safety intelligence, this 
second study employed an interview method.  Interviews are a more open approach to data collection 
and are ideal for capturing issues in their complexity and entirety (Flick, 1998). Consequently this 
approach allowed us to contextualise our findings and to better illustrate the content of the personal 
attributes.  The interview questions related to senior managers’ actual work on safety and did not ask 
them explicitly about ideal characteristics and behaviours for this work, to differentiate the approach 
from the previous study.  The senior managers were from a number of different positions, not only 
CEOs, allowing an evaluation of the characteristics’ relevance for senior managers’ work on safety 
in those different senior positions.   
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Sample and Recruitment 
Participants were contacted through the Safety R & D Department at EUROCONTROL.  The 
sample consisted of senior managers (N=9, response rate = 81%) working for three national ATM 
organisations (ANSPs).  These subject matter experts held senior positions such as CEO (in charge 
of management of the entire organisation; n=2), COO (responsible for the daily operation of the 
organisation; n=3), Director of Safety (n=3) and Director of Air Navigation Services (n=1), with all 
being part of the executive teams of their organisations.  Average time in position was 32.8 months 
(SD= 19.3 months).   
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3.1.2 Procedure 
Individual semi-structured interviews were carried out on site by two trained interviewers.  
Average interview duration was 74.9 min (SD = 15.7, range 60-113 min), using an explorative 
approach (Scheele & Groeben, 1988).  The interviews touched upon the most central aspect of senior 
managers’ work in relation to safety (based on descriptions of general senior managerial activities by 
Tengblad, 2006).  Questions related to the experience of participants, their work environment and 
typical work activities (e.g. can you describe a typical day’s work?).  Following this, questions 
focused on meeting activities (e.g. how often do you usually have top management team meetings?), 
decision making in relation to safety (e.g. can you give an example of a safety related decision you 
have made recently?), participants’ views on safety culture (e.g. how would you describe the safety 
culture of your organisation?) and how participants show their commitment to safety (e.g. in what 
ways can you display your commitment to safety?).   
3.1.3 Coding Analysis 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed by two independent raters using deductive 
qualitative content analysis as in Study 1 (Mayring, 2000).  The coding scheme included the overall 
characteristics and their subcomponents (see Appendix 1).  Although additional concepts had 
emerged from Study 1, it was decided to exclude these in the initial coding scheme, to evaluate 
whether these would also emerge from the interview material.  Raters were advised to identify 
meaning units defined as “words, sentences or paragraphs containing aspects related to each other 
through their content and context” (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004, p. 106).  The final interrater 
reliability (α = 0.72; 95% CI 0.67 to 0.77) fulfilled the criteria for tentative conclusions (Krippendorff, 
2004).   
3.2 Results and Summary Study 2 
Table 2 shows the relevance of the characteristics and their subcomponents and Table 3 provides 
example quotes for the most frequently identified subcomponent within each concept.  As in the 
previous study, the personal characteristics captured the data well, as 93% of participants’ responses 
were categorised as reflecting the components of the model. ‘Leadership’ also emerged as an 
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additional concept explaining 7% of the data, mostly containing descriptions identified as authentic 
leadership.   
Similar, to Study 1 social competence was most frequently identified (33% of all meaning units) 
and its most relevant content contained engaging with others, persuasion and perceiving others.  This 
finding is in line with the general senior management literature (e.g. Tengblad, 2006) and the safety 
literature (e.g. Harper et al., 1996) description of senior managerial activities and this group’s 
influence on organisations and safety respectively.  Also similar to Study 1, safety knowledge was 
one of the most frequently identified characteristic in the interview study (29% of all meaning units). 
In line with the senior leadership literature (Mintzberg et al., 1998), the results emphasise the 
importance of facts and information as an aspect of safety knowledge for senior managerial work.  
Theoretical and practical understanding and awareness gained by experience regarding safety were 
also indicated as relevant for senior managers’ work in relation to safety.   
As in Study 1, we also found motivation to be moderately relevant (15% of all meaning units). 
Contrary to the findings of Study 1 of prevention focus to be more desirable in CEOs according to 
their subordinates, promotion focus was the most frequently identified subcomponent of regulatory 
focus in this study.  Usually, individuals high on promotion focus are described as engaged in 
behaviours that maximize production, whereas prevention focus leads to more vigilance to ensure 
safety (Wallace & Chen, 2006).  This study, using responses from the senior managers themselves 
commenting on their own work, indicates that the ideal and actual way that senior managers approach 
goals in their work might not agree. It seems that senior managers themselves follow an eagerness 
strategy. Senior managerial work has been described as having increased in workload and intensity 
since the 1970s (Tengblad, 2006) and it is possible that role incumbents will have a stronger focus on 
getting things done quickly because of a greater awareness of the workload entailed in their roles.   
Also similar to Study 1 was the relative frequency with which problem-solving emerged (10% of 
all meaning units).  Understanding problems and generating ideas were the most frequently identified 
subcomponents of problem-solving, whereas planning for action was indicated least frequently.  This 
might reflect the nature of senior managerial work, as they not necessarily responsible for the 
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implementation of solutions.  Generally senior managers need to have an understanding of the 
problems that their organisations face to prioritise issues and aspects of problems to ensure their 
decisions reflect their commitment to safety (Fruhen et al., 2013b).   
The personality traits of the Big Five were least frequently indicated in this study (7% of all 
meaning units). Previous research reports senior managerial personality (Big-Five) as relevant for 
organisational culture (e.g. Giberson et al., 2009). It is possible that the interviewees did not 
frequently mention aspects of personality, as questions focused on work activities. It is also possible 
that this was due to self reporting and actor-observer asymmetry, as actors tend to attribute their own 
behaviour to stimuli inherent in the situation, whereas observers tend to attribute behaviour to stable 
dispositions of the actor (Jones & Nisbett, 1971).  Within personality, conscientiousness was 
frequently indicated, which can be due to its focus on the way individuals work (Costa &McCrae, 
1992), as the interview questions concerned the participants’ work.  
3.3.1 Strengths and limitations of study 2 
Study 2 used interviews to test and complement the findings of Study 1 and to further investigate 
the content of the characteristics for senior managers’ safety intelligence.  This study was more 
subjective and reflected the inside views of senior managers themselves.  Asking senior managers 
about their own work could have however biased their responses through impression management.   
As in the previous study, our analysis was conducted deductively.  Had the analysis been carried 
out inductively, a different set of attributes might have emerged.  However, our analysis did allow 
additional themes to emerge.  Finally, it is acknowledged that the sample is small.  However, it fulfils 
the baseline size for saturation, especially for homogenous samples (Guest et al., 2006).  
4. Overall Discussion 
Overall, the results from both studies suggest a set of traits, skills and knowledge relate to senior 
managers’ safety intelligence.  Figure 1 shows the most relevant characteristics at the core of safety 
intelligence, along with leadership, which emerged from both studies as also relevant, particularly 
transformational (Study 1) and authentic leadership (Study 2).  The findings echo descriptions of 
characteristics found to be central to senior managerial influence on other organisational outcomes 
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(e.g. Carmeli & Tishler, 2006; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Miller & Toulouse, 1986, Mumford et al., 
2000).  Therefore safety as an organisational goal may be achieved in a similar manner as other 
objectives and requiring similar skills and traits in senior managers.  However, the two studies were 
conducted in ATM, a business that has safety as a central component of its service.  These senior 
managers may approach safety policies as they do other strategic goals.  The frequency with which 
the majority of the characteristics can be ranked did not differ notably in the two studies, 
notwithstanding the mixed method design.  It should be noted that the contents which emerged from 
Study 2 might be more informative as the subcomponents of each characteristic were identified in 
this study by the coders and should therefore be given a stronger weight in the evaluation of the 
characteristics content.  We discuss each characteristic below, starting with the most relevant.  
Social competence 
The safety literature has frequently described senior managers’ personable communication and 
active involvement, including site visits as central to their influence on safety (Hopkins, 2011; Harper 
et al., 1996).  Likewise, our findings support social competence to be particularly relevant for senior 
managerial influence on safety.  Descriptions of social competence in Study 1 and 2 often reflected a 
tendency to engage with others through for example an open door policy and suggested the ability to 
listen to others as especially relevant. This finding supports Schein’s (2012) suggestion of humble 
inquiry as an effective tool for senior managers to influence their organisations.  Study 2 also showed 
persuasion to be relevant for senior managers’ safety intelligence and this is likely to help them to 
communicate strong messages concerning safety policies.  Persuasion might be particularly relevant 
as safety is an abstract goal, for which indicators are not easily defined (Hale, 2009).  According to 
the goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) these attributes make it all the more challenging to 
maintain safety as an organisational goal, requiring senior managers to be even more convincing.  
Safety knowledge 
Senior mangers’ knowledge has been identified as relevant for their influence on organisations 
(Finkelstein, 1992) and they have been described as information workers (Mintzberg, et al., 1998).  
However, safety knowledge had not been previously considered by the safety literature as 
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contributing to their influence on safety. Our findings suggest that senior managers’ safety knowledge 
can support them in influencing safety positively and so safety knowledge might warrant more 
attention from safety researchers. Particularly their theoretical and practical understanding of safety 
issues (Study 1) and their knowledge on facts and information (Study 2) were indicated as relevant 
here.  
Motivation 
Motivation, conceptualised as regulatory focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997), was next most 
frequently identified across the two studies.  Achievement motivation has been found to strongly 
correlate with senior managers’ influence on organisational outcomes (e.g. Miller et al., 1988) and 
our findings suggest that this trait is also relevant for their influence on safety. However the results 
concerning regulatory focus were contradictive between Study 1 and 2. In Study 1 it was mostly 
identified via prevention focus, whereas promotion focus was the dominant theme in Study 2 for this 
trait (see section 3.2). It is possible that work on safety issues might require senior managers to 
balance caution with working quickly through a number of tasks (Hambrick, 1989).  However, as 
discussed above, it is possible that the ideal (i.e. prevention focus) and the actual (i.e. promotion 
focus) motivational approaches by senior managers differ. This issue requires more detailed 
investigation in the future. 
Problem-solving 
Although problem-solving is described as the most important part of senior managerial work (e.g. 
Eden & Spender, 1998) and as relevant for their influence on organisational safety (Zohar & Luria, 
2005), it was only found to be the fourth most relevant characteristic across the two studies. Problem-
solving was mostly indicated through the way senior managers understand problems and consider 
various sources of information. Possibly, participants did not mention problem-solving more 
frequently, because it is not a directly observable activity and senior managers understand it as an 
integral part of their work (Mintzberg, 1975).  Furthermore, problem-solving might have been 
confounded with other activities such as social interaction, as senior managers often discuss problems 
in groups and meetings (Zaccaro et al., 2000).   
SAFETY INTELLIGENCE 17 
 
Personality 
Overall, personality was the least frequently indicated characteristic in relation to senior managers’ 
safety intelligence. Accordingly, it should not be considered as central to their influence on safety 
through their policy making and enactment.   
Interpersonal leadership 
Finally, although some researchers have argued that interpersonal leadership is not related to senior 
level leaders’ influence (Zaccaro & Horn, 2003), it emerged from both studies as relevant for their 
influence on organisational safety. The results of Study 1, involving direct reports of CEOs, suggested 
that CEOs may affect organisational safety through interpersonal leadership styles exerted on their 
teams. It is possible that this form of influence then cascades through the hierarchical layers of the 
organisations. However it is also possible that, for example authenticity is communicated through 
interactions during site visits, but might not require direct contact with members of the organisation 
(i.e. be expressed through speeches or written material).  Interpersonal leadership might have emerged 
more often in Study 1 because the direct reports involved in the data collection were more exposed 
to their CEOs’ interpersonal leadership behaviours and therefore value them as more prominent and 
important. It is however also probable that interpersonal leadership is especially relevant for CEOs’ 
influence on safety as it has previously been found to influence firm performance (Waldman et al, 
2004). 
 
In summary, we found safety intelligence in senior managers, i.e. their positive influence on safety 
through their ability to device and enact safety policies, to be particularly supported by their social 
competence and safety knowledge.  It can be proposed that social competence will particularly aid 
senior managers in enacting their policies and that safety knowledge is central to the development of 
these policies.   
4.2 Future research 
This study is only a first, exploratory step towards a better understanding of attributes relevant to 
senior managers’ safety intelligence.  Future research can build on our findings by considering the 
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following issues.  First, an investigation of the views of employees further down the organisational 
hierarchy can complement the perspective of direct reports and role incumbents.  Inclusion of more 
junior managers and the workforce can help identify whether senior managers’ personal 
characteristics differ in their influence on safety at different organisational levels.  Secondly, the 
safety intelligence attributes in this study could be studied in relation to safety outcomes such as 
safety culture, but also to employees’ safety related behaviours, accident rates or even safety policies.  
Finally, future research should be carried out in industry sectors other than ATM, as these other 
industries might pose different challenges for senior managers.   
4.3 Conclusion and practical implications 
CEOs and other senior managers carry the responsibility for their organisations (Hambrick, 1989).  
Investigation reports repeatedly highlight this group’s contribution to organisational safety, yet they 
are under researched (Flin, 2003).  Insights of what it takes in terms of characteristics to perform 
safety related management duties effectively are essential to inform best practices for selection, 
training, evaluation and reward systems (Landy & Vasey, 1991).  The findings of the two studies can 
have relevance for the determination of selection criteria for CEOs and other senior managers.  It can 
be proposed that social competence and safety knowledge will be the most effective areas to target 
for trainings and other interventions.  These findings have been included in a recent White Paper 
published by EUROCONTROL (2013) to provide guidance to senior managers in ATM concerning 
their influence on safety.  It needs to be considered to what extent the findings from the ATM domain 
can be applied in other industry settings. However, because ATM is so highly reliable, it is proposed 
that they are likely to represent characteristics that will be effective in managing organisations safety 
in many other industries. Application of the insights from this study may help to ensure senior 
managers have what it takes to be safety intelligent.   
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Table 1. 
Summary of frequencies of the model components in questionnaire data (Study 1) 
 Characteristics Examples 




• open to new ideas 







ƒ = 78 
(14% of all meaning units) 
 
 Regulatory Focus  
ƒ = 61  
(11% of all meaning units) 
• proactive 
• devoted to safety 
• ensured safety has equal priority 
• proactive in safety domain 
 
Skills    
 Problem-solving 
ƒ = 61  
(11% of all meaning units) 
• balancing safety appropriately with costs 
• makes decisions after consultation 
• sees interconnections and interdependencies 
• readiness to understand problems 
• makes decisions explicit on safety and capacity 




 Social competence  
ƒ = 92  
(16% of all meaning units) 
• having a good 
contact with all 
levels of the 
organisation 
• operating an open 
door policy 
• being a good listener 
• asks questions 
• good at listening 
• listens to everyone 
• talks with 
everyone in the 
organisation 
• very good 
communication 
skills 
• good at listening 
• captures all 
views 
• engages people at 





 Safety Knowledge 
ƒ = 85  
(15% of all meaning units) 
• understands how 
safety culture is 
build 
• understands the 
risks 
• knows about safety 
• educated in safety 
problems 
• understanding of 
safety issues 
• trained in safety 
and aviation 
• understanding 
safety management  
• familiar with 
safety management 
systems 
• understands own 
safety impact 
• familiar with 
regulatory issues 
• demands data on 
safety  





Others    
  Leadership  
ƒ = 78  
(14% of all meaning units) 








• taking the full 
responsibility 
• Is supportive 
• Has a good 
leadership 
• Example in 
behaviour 
• Walks the talk 
Note: Overall meaning units coded = 568; ƒ = frequency  
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Table 2. 
Summary of frequencies of the model components and their subcomponents identified in the interviews (Study 
2) 
 Characteristics (percentages across 
overall characteristics)  
Sub-components within each 
characteristic 
Percentages within each 
characteristic 
Traits   
 Personality 
ƒ = 17 (7% of all meaning units) 
α = 0.89  
(95% CI 0.68 - 1.00) 
Conscientiousness  67% 
 Agreeableness  11% 
 General 11% 
 Extraversion  6% 
 Openness to experience 6% 
 Emotional stability 0% 
    
 Regulatory focus  
ƒ = 44 (15% of all meaning units) 
α = 0.60  
(95% CI 0.53 - 0.80) 
Promotion focus 69% 
 Prevention focus 31% 
Skills    
 Problem-solving 
ƒ = 27 (10% of all meaning units) 
α = 0.71  
(95% CI 0.47 - 0.94), 
‘Understanding the problem’ 57% 
 ‘Generating ideas’ 22% 
 Planning for action 13% 
 General 9% 
    
 Social competence  
ƒ = 93 (33% of all meaning units) 
α = 0.65 
(95% CI 0.51 - 0.78) 
Engaging with others 63% 
 Persuasion 25% 
 ‘Perceiving others’ 11% 
 Expressiveness  1% 
 Social adaptability  0% 
    
 Safety knowledge 
ƒ = 82 (29% of all meaning units) 
α = 0.68  
(95% CI 0.53 - 0.80) 
Facts and information 51% 
 Theoretical and practical 
understanding 
21% 
 Awareness gained by 
experience 
17% 
 Background and education 11% 
Other    
 Emerged concepts 
ƒ = 19 (7% of all meaning units) 
Authenticity 69% 
 Trust 15% 
 α = 0.89  
(95% CI 0.68 - 1.00) 
Vision 15% 
Note: Overall meaning units coded = 362; ƒ = frequency; percentages on the right refer to the proportion of 
frequency within each characteristic; α is Krippendorf’s alpha, CI = confidence interval 
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Table 3. 
Example quotes for the most frequently identified components within each concept in the interview responses 
Characteristics Example quotes 
Personality 
Conscientiousness 
“Because, me, myself I would never compromise [safety] if I meant it was 
going in the wrong direction.”  
Regulatory focus 
Promotion focus 
“It is like when you try to lose weight. Once you can see the result you 
tend to be more motivated to keep going.  And it is the same with the 
business.  I can see in my business, that rather than the safety performance 
being a negative thing, which it was when I started two years ago, people 
now see it as a sense of pride that actually the people that work in the 




“So I am looking at where the greatest risk lies. And then I make sure that 
I am happy that the plans to manage that risk are being dealt with. So if we 
are having […] a period of safety issues, incidents or near misses or 
whatever, then I am very involved in what we are doing about it, what it is. 
Let’s understand it.”   




We are trying to establish yearly meetings with all the chief air traffic 
controllers now, for two days. Where we have safety discussions on 
standardisation, and also staffing and safety issues from the safety staff.” 
“We dedicate time where we discuss safety. For example we have every 
second week we have meetings in my divisions where we discuss all safety 
related issues.” 
Safety knowledge 
Facts & Information 
“The safety department will do an analysis of the safety issues and find 
mitigations if this is necessary and then we decide if we do it or not.” 
“How do we generate data and information about what is our current 
risk, what is our future risk? Because I think we almost drown ourselves in 
too much information” 
Leadership style 
Authenticity 
“People have to know that right from the top safety really is not just 
something people will say is our number one priority. You know, it is there, 
it is there all the time.” 
“You can’t fake being committed to safety. You either are or you are not.” 
 
  





Conceptual model of safety intelligence 
 
Note: Characteristics are ordered based on their ranked percentages across the two studies so that the more 
dominant characteristics are a located at the core of the model. 
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Appendix  
Coding scheme (Summary) 
 
1. Try to get an understanding for the coding categories and their subcomponents. Are you sure you can 
distinguish them and can repeat their meaning in your own words? 
2. Review the questionnaire outline to understand the questions being asked.  
3. Start analysing the responses. Every response should be coded. 
a. Please look through the coding scheme and identify which of the coding categories is most likely 
to fit the response made by the participant. 
b. It is possible that not all relevant categories are included in the coding scheme. If you cannot fit 
a response into any of the predetermined categories, please identify as other. Please make 
suggestions, what you think each response in this category will most likely reflect.  
 
Social Competence 
• Engaging with others  
• Social perception: perceiving others (traits, intentions, and motives) 
• Social adaptability: ability to adapt to, or feel comfortable in social situations 
• Expressiveness: ability to express one’s emotions and feelings  
• Persuasion: Ability to change others’ attitudes and/or their behaviour in desired directions. Convincing 
others to do something. 
 
Safety Knowledge 
• Expertise and skills, experience or education The theoretical or practical understanding of safety  
• Facts and information: Awareness gained by experience:  
Problem-solving  
Participants might describe different parts of problem-solving 
• Understanding the problem: define, construct, or focus your problem-solving efforts, looking for 
information) 
• Generating ideas: Producing varied ideas. Identifying promising possibilities 
• Planning for action: select, strengthen and support promising solutions. 
 
Personality 
• Extraversion: sociable, talkative, assertive 
• Openness to experience: imaginative, artistically, sensitive, intellectually 
• Emotional instability: tense, insecure, nervous (neg. pole) 
• Conscientiousness :responsible, dependable, persistent, achievement oriented 
• Agreeableness: good-natured, cooperative, trusting 
 
Motivation 
• Promotion focus: orientation towards achieving positive outcomes: accomplishments and gains  
o can be indicated by prioritisation of issues 
• Prevention focus: avoiding negative outcomes when working towards a goal: focus on safety and 
responsibility  
o can be avoidance of risks 
 
Other 
• Whatever topics you think are lacking in the above and should be considered as well. 
 
 
